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Dynamics of Social Norms in the City∗
Fabien MOIZEAU†
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Abstract
We study how in a city either opposite social norms remain or a particular code of behavior
spreads and ultimately prevails. We develop a multicommunity model with overlapping
generations. When young, an individual chooses a certain level of educational eﬀort. The
crucial feature is that the decision is inﬂuenced by peers living in the area who favor a
social norm either valuing education or discrediting it. When an adult, an individual who
cares about both her oﬀspring’s expected income and the social norm chooses the family’s
location. Endogenous location leads to diﬀerent patterns of social norms in the city. We
identify two types of urban equilibrium: a culturally-balanced city where social norms are
distributed evenly among urban areas and where the rate of education is the same in each
urban area and a culturally-divided city where urban areas oppose on their prevailing social
norm and exhibit diﬀerent rates of education. We then study the dynamics of social norms.
We show that there are multiple long-run patterns of social norms. A particular steady state
is achieved depending on the initial distribution support for social norms in the population.
Finally, we show that a public policy promoting social integration can lead, in the long run,
to a population unanimously discrediting education. Enforcing social integration can obtain
less education than allowing the culturally-divided city to arise.
Keywords: peer eﬀects, social norms, residential segregation, human capital inequality.
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1 Introduction
The striking fact about urban inequality is that social problems such as criminal activities, un-
employment, school drop-out rates, teenage childbearing, are concentrated in urban areas, for
instance the inner-city areas in the US and the suburbs in Europe. Ethnographic and sociological
studies have documented that the concentration of social problems in depressed communities may
entertain a culture of poverty which opposes the mainstream culture and traps their inhabitants
into poverty (see among others Wilson, 1987, Anderson 1999 and the survey of Lamont and Small,
2008). The concentration of social problems in some depressed communities is thus a threat for
social cohesion and raises the issue of the design of public policies aiming to ﬁght against urban
inequality.
The purpose of this paper is to understand why, in some urban areas, subcultures favoring
standards of behavior which prove to be detrimental for their inhabitants emerge and perpetuate
over time. We focus on particular neighborhood eﬀects, that is social norms followed by peers.
Youth decisions are driven by the concern to follow some social norms because obedience to
the code of behavior prescribed by a particular social norm generates reputation beneﬁts while
disobedience incurs stigmatization costs.
There is now a widespread consensus on the inﬂuence of social interactions on behavioral
and economic outcomes. In particular, the youth while taking decisions appear to be strongly
inﬂuenced by their local environment. For instance, Gaviria and Raphael (2001) ﬁnd strong
evidence of peer-group eﬀects at the school level for drug use, alcohol drinking, cigarette smoking,
church going and the likelihood of dropping out of high school. Furthermore, there is evidence
that these peer-group eﬀects may be the result of peer pressure. At school level, it has been widely
documented that pupils engage in harassment and other types of peer pressure in order to enforce
norms of behavior (see Bishop, 2003, for a broad review of ethnographic and psychological studies
on this issue and also for the study he conducted from the Educational Excellence Alliance’s
Survey of Student Culture)1. One explanation of the racial achievement gap in education lies in
‘acting white’ peer externality which refers to the stigmatization exerted by peers if one invests in
the behavioral characteristic of whites (see Fryer and Torelli, 2010). Furthermore, using data from
the ‘Moving To Opportunity’ experiment, Kling et al. (2007) ﬁnd modest peer eﬀects in education
for the male youth. They explain this result by saying that the experimental male group may have
1Studying peer eﬀects in the workplace, Mas and Moretti (2009) ﬁnd evidence of the inﬂuence of coworkers’ pro-
ductivity on work eﬀort. This inﬂuence is stronger for coworkers with whom interactions are frequent, corroborating
that social pressure is a way to internalize free-riding externalities.
2
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
responded to peer pressure to signal that they have not abandoned their original neighborhood
culture by returning to the original neighborhood.
These local interactions may help explain why socioeconomic opportunities vary with the place
of residence (see for instance the surveys of Durlauf, 2004, Ioannides, 2013, Topa and Zenou, 2014).
The recent work of Chetty et al. (2014) provides new evidence that patterns of social mobility
diﬀer signiﬁcantly across space. Using data from the federal income tax records over the period
1996-2012, they study a measure of absolute upward mobility deﬁned as the mean income rank of
children with parents in the bottom half of the income distribution. They divide the US into 741
Commuting Zones. They obtain that for commuting zones in the top decile the income rank is
above the 52nd percentile while it is below the 37th percentile in the bottom decile. This diﬀerence
translates into substantial diﬀerences in children’s incomes. Furthermore, Chetty et al. (2014) ﬁnd
that upward social mobility is signiﬁcantly correlated to observable characteristics of commuting
zones. In particular, they ﬁnd a strong negative correlation with segregation by race or income
and a positive correlation with quality of the K-12 school system (measured by lower drop-out
rates, higher test scores and smaller class sizes). This study stresses that local environment may
be key to explain the spatial variation of social mobility although it does not prove any causal
relationship.2
This paper studies the relationship between dynamics of social norms and urban inequality. In
order to grasp both the local nature and the dynamic aspect of a social norm inﬂuence, we develop
a multicommunity model with overlapping generations. Individuals live two periods, childhood
and adulthood. When a child, each individual decides which level of educational eﬀort to exert. In
accordance with the empirical results mentioned above on the strong evidence of peer inﬂuence at
school, we assume that the education decision depends on the economic returns to education, the
cost of eﬀort and also the reputation beneﬁts and stigmatization costs generated by the adherence
to or the deviation from, respectively, the social norm. We consider that a child faces two opposing
social norms: one valuing education and prescribing high eﬀort (named the ‘education’ social
norm) and the other one depreciating schooling eﬀort and prescribing low eﬀort at school (named
the ‘no education’ social norm). We assume that children are heterogeneous with respect to their
preferences. Individuals are called education believers or non education believers, respectively,
when they take care about the costs and beneﬁts of adhering to or deviating from the ‘education’
2Spatial variation of socioeconomic success is also observed in France. Using data on public middle schools
in Paris, Fack and Grenet (2010) ﬁnd that performance varies signiﬁcantly across space. Best public middle
schools tend to be located in both the central and western parts of Paris while the worst public schools are in the
north-eastern district.
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or ‘no education’ social norm. We capture the local nature of a social norm assuming that the
stigmatization costs and reputation beneﬁts of a social norm depend on the fraction of inhabitants
in the urban area who believe in this social norm. When an adult, an individual chooses the place
of residence of the family, comprised of her oﬀspring and herself. In a ﬁrst step, we assume limited
altruism so that parents only care about their child’s future income. Hence, the intensity of a
social norm is endogenous as it will be determined by the emerging urban equilibrium. The second
key feature of the model is that the population of believers in a social norm evolves over time. In
this respect, we follow the argument of Akerlof (1980) that a social norm spreads if the number
of individuals adhering to the social norm is greater than the number of individuals believing
in this social norm. Our model thus allows us to study the interplay between the dynamics of
opposite social norms and the dynamics of the organization of the city. At date t, a particular
urban equilibrium may emerge depending on the population characteristics, that is the number
of believers and non-believers in the population. This equilibrium implies particular incentives to
educate in each neighborhood. This will drive a new number of believers which gives rise to a
new urban conﬁguration at date t+1. On the whole, the social norms dynamics are driven by the
urban conﬁguration that arises.
Our results are threefold. First, we identify urban equilibria that arise at each date t and
that are characterized by the spatial distribution of believers and non-believers. In particular, a
symmetric equilibrium, called ‘culturally-balanced’, emerges where believers and non-believers are
uniformly located in the city leading urban areas to be identical with respect to the social norms
mix. It turns out that incentives faced by any child to exert educational eﬀort are independent of
their location. Education rates are identical across urban areas. On the contrary, some asymmetric
equilibria, called ‘culturally-divided’, can also arise. They are such that urban areas diﬀer with
respect to the prevailing social norm and the implied education rate. Depending on the fraction
of believers in the whole population, the ‘culturally-divided’ city can exhibit two types of cultural
clash: either an urban area only inhabited by believers that unanimously promotes education and
contrasts with other locations where both social norms are present, or an urban area only inhabited
by non-believers deterring from any education eﬀort and that opposes other urban areas with both
social norms. The asymmetric equilibria are consistent with the signiﬁcant variation across space
of social mobility found by Chetty et al. (2014). Second, we study the social norms dynamics
which arise under either cultural division or cultural integration. We show that social norms
dynamics exhibit a contagion process so that once the population of believers in the urban area
reaches a threshold, the underlying social norm spreads. In particular, if the number of believers
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in the ‘education’ social norm is too low then the urban area can be trapped in a low-education
equilibrium while high education is promoted in the rest of the city. Hence, the initial number of
believers is key to determine the type of long-run equilibrium that is reached. This model thus
highlights how two societies with slight diﬀerences in their populations of believers may exhibit
very diﬀerent social norms dynamics and experience varying performances in terms of education.
Third, we show that if the culturally-balanced equilibrium is imposed by the government it may
reach a low-level equilibrium at the steady state. On the contrary, this same economy would
obtain the culturally-divided equilibrium under laissez-faire and would exhibit dynamics reaching
a high-level equilibrium. This result corroborates ﬁndings by Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (2008)
on the positive impact of isolation on better-educated groups.
We then study two extensions of the model. First, we assume that parents are aﬀected by
the social norms of the neighborhood. Second, we consider that utility of private consumption is
strictly concave. It turns out that the willingness to pay to live in an urban area depends on both
social norms eﬀects and income eﬀect. In particular, if their child adheres to the ‘no education’
social norm, parents are no longer willing to pay to live in the urban area with the strongest
incentives for education as her oﬀspring might incur stigmatization by peers. Furthermore, income
inequality is also key to determine the highest bidders for a particular urban area. This extended
model gives rise to a richer pattern of urban equilibria.
Our paper belongs to three strands of literature. First, it is related to the literature on
human capital accumulation with neighborhood eﬀects which has been impulsed by Loury (1977)
and Bénabou (1993, 1996a,b). We depart from their work as we focus on particular neighborhood
eﬀects, that is social norms, that involve reputation or stigmatization eﬀects which shape incentives
to educate and follow the norm. We are thus able to study the dynamics of neighborhood eﬀects
and characterize the conditions under which a social norm spreads or, on the contrary, disappears
over time. Second, our paper belongs to the economic literature on social norms which has explored
how the inﬂuence of social norms helps to explain unemployment (see for instance Akerlof, 1980),
trade union membership (see Naylor 1989, Corneo, 1995), decisions about work and beneﬁts in
the welfare state (see Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 1999) or more generally the emergence
of cooperation (see, for instance, Tabellini, 2008). We depart from this literature as costs and
beneﬁts to follow a social norm depend on the neighborhood population characterizing an urban
equilibrium. Third, our paper also belongs to the literature on the formation of oppositional
identities (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, Battu, Mwale and Zenou, 2007, Bisin, Patacchini,
Verdier and Zenou, 2011). Compared to this literature, our contribution is that the persistence
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or the disappearance of a particular social norm relies on the endogenous degree of segregation
between believers and non-believers.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following section we set up the model. In section 3,
we characterize the urban equilibrium which emerges at each date t. Then in section 4, we study
the dynamics of social norms when cultural division perpetuates. In section 5, we examine the
inﬂuence of cultural balance on the dynamics of social norms and long-run economic performances.
In section 6, we study some extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Setup
We consider an overlapping generations model of neighborhood formation. The essential features
of the model are such that (i) during their life, individuals make educational decisions and location
choices, (ii) and that individuals derive utility from obeying a particular social norm.
2.1 The City
The city is comprised of two residential areas indexed by j = 1, 2. We consider that landowners
are absent and without loss of generality we normalize the opportunity cost of building a house to
0. Houses are identical across the city. The inelastic supply of houses within a residential area is
of mass L. This land market is a closed-city model where the population of the city is a continuum
of families of mass N . Each family, comprised of a parent and a child, lives in one and only one
house. The city can accommodate the entire population and we assume for the sake of simplicity
that L = N/2. Agents live two periods. When a child, an individual faces a discrete educational
choice. When an adult, an individual has to decide in which neighborhood her family will reside.
2.2 Children’s Educational Choice and Social Norms
Preferences. Any child i has to decide to exert a discrete educational eﬀort, ei ∈ {0, 1}. The
crucial feature of the model is that there are two opposite social norms regarding schooling be-
havior. One social norm values the behavior ‘exerting an eﬀort at school’ (exerting ei = 1 in
the model) and the other one prescribes the code of behavior ‘not exerting an eﬀort at school’
(exerting ei = 0). Children diﬀer with respect to their beliefs underlying the code of behavior,
i.e. their preferences regarding the social norm. We call generation t the individuals who are
born at date t. There are Bt, respectively N − Bt, individuals of generation t who believe in the
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values underlying the norm ‘exerting an eﬀort at school’, respectively ‘not exerting an eﬀort at
school’. For the sake of brevity, we call believers (implicitly ‘education’ believers) the individuals
who believe in the norm ‘exerting an eﬀort at school’ and non-believers (implicitly ‘non-education’
believers) those who believe in ‘not exerting an eﬀort at school’.
This formalization is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Liu et al. (2014) that individuals
tend to conform to the education social norm of their friends. The existence of opposite social
norms could be justiﬁed by the fact that pupils diﬀer with respect to their identity which dictates
particular educational behavior (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, Bishop, 2003, 2004 for models of
slackers’ or nerds’ identity). Furthermore, ethnic identity can oppose the social norm accepted
by the majority. Studies in the US have emphasized that African-American students may oppose
values of studiousness and hard work as they are embraced by whites (see, for instance, Fodham
and Ogbu, 1986, Fryer and Torelli, 2010).
We specify preferences following the works of Akerlof (1980), Naylor (1989) or Corneo (1993)
which study how social norms can overcome the free rider problem arising under voluntary union
trade membership or collective strike action. Precisely, preferences of a child i living in area
j = 1, 2 at date t are deﬁned as follows:
Û i,jt = p(ei)U
i
t+1(wr) + (1− p(ei))U it+1(wp)− εic(ei) + (ei − (1− ei)) bjt ĥ if i a believer,
U˜ i,jt = p(ei)U
i
t+1(wr) + (1− p(ei))U it+1(wp)− εic(ei) + (−ei + (1− ei)) (1− bjt)h˜ if i a non-believer
with U it+1(w) the utility when i is parent with income w = wr, wp. She earns income wr, respectively
wp < wr, with probability p(ei), respectively 1− p(ei), while exerting eﬀort ei. We assume for the
sake of simplicity that p(1) = 1 and p (0) = 0. U it+1(w) will be speciﬁed in the following section
while describing parents preferences. εic(ei) is the cost of eﬀort with c(1) = c > 0 and c(0) = 0
and εi his innate ability. We assume that children diﬀer with respect to their innate ability, εi.
The lower the εi the brighter the individual. εi is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
The social norm component is (ei − (1− ei)) bjt ĥ for a believer and (−ei + (1− ei)) (1 − bjt)h˜
for a non-believer. Parameters ĥ and h˜, respectively, capture the relative taste for the ‘education’
social norm, ‘no education’ social norm respectively. Both parameters ĥ and h˜ are positive. We
do not make any particular assumption about the magnitude of h˜ with respect to ĥ. We deﬁne
the fraction of believers in area j by bjt ≡ Bjt /L. Hence, our speciﬁcation of the social norm
component implies that the obedience of the code of behavior the child believes in provides a
reputation beneﬁt. It is equal to bjt ĥ for a believer and (1 − bjt)h˜ for a non-believer. In contrast,
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the disobedience of the code of behavior incurs a stigmatization cost equal to bjt ĥ for a believer
and (1 − bjt)h˜ for a non-believer.3 We depart from the literature on social norms by considering
the existence of neighborhood eﬀects. Incentives to follow the social norm depend on the fraction
of people in the neighborhood believing in this norm. Precisely, for an individual, both reputation
and stigmatization eﬀects increase with the fraction of the neighborhood population with the
same beliefs. We consider that beliefs rather than actions provide incentives to follow a social
norm because actions reﬂect imperfectly the distribution of preferences for the social norm in
the population. Actions are driven by various incentives and are impacted by shocks. In our
model, some believers decide to not educate because they are disabled by an adverse ability
shock4. Nonetheless, we recognize that a persistent discrepancy between the number of individuals
believing in a social norm and the number of individuals following its code of behavior may call
into question the stability of the norm. As it will become clear when presenting the social norms
dynamics, we require that a social norm is stable in the long run so that the number of agents
who believe in it equal the number of agents who follow it.
We do not consider that cross-population eﬀects such as neighboring with believers or non-
believers, respectively, generate some reputation and stigmatization eﬀects for non-believers or
believers, respectively. Introducing such eﬀects would not change the main results of the model.
However, it will become clear later that there are still externalities between believers and non-
believers generated by the location choice which will determine the socioeconomic composition of
urban areas and thus the pattern of neighborhood eﬀects.
Educational Choice. We assume that any child inherits the beliefs of his parent. Given these
beliefs, she chooses her level of eﬀort. A believer i residing in area j decides to educate if and only
3We could consider preferences with a parameter h for the reputation beneﬁt diﬀering from a parameter n for
the stigmatization cost:
Û jt = p(e)Ut+1(wr) + (1− p(e))Ut+1(wp)− εc(e) +
(
sĥ− (1− s)n̂
)
bjt for a believer,
U˜ jt = p(e)Ut+1(wr) + (1− p(e))Ut+1(wr)− εc(e) +
(
−sn˜+ (1− s)h˜
)
(1− bjt ) for a non-believer.
This would not change the main mechanisms of the model.
4We abstract from an asymmetric information setup where the level of eﬀort may be a signal of individual
preferences (see Bernheim, 1994, for a signalling model of social conformity).
We also do not formalize the decision taken by an individual to exert pressure in case peers deviate from the
social norm (see Kandel and Lazear, 1992, for a model of peer pressure).
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if
U it+1(wr)− εic+ bjt ĥ > U it+1(wp)− bjt ĥ.
Letting ΔU it+1 ≡ U it+1(wr)− U it+1(wp), this amounts to
εi < ε̂i(b
j
t) ≡
ΔU it+1 + 2b
j
t ĥ
c
. (1)
Neighborhood eﬀects are crucial for the education decision. The larger the fraction of believers in
the neighborhood the more likely the individual i exerts eﬀort ei = 1, that is ε̂i(b
j
t) is increasing
with bjt and ε̂(0) = ΔU
i
t+1/c < ε̂(1) = (ΔU
i
t+1 + 2ĥ)/c.
A non-believer k residing in area j decides to exert high eﬀort if and only if
Ukt+1(wr)− εkc− (1− bjt)h˜ > Ukt+1(wp) + (1− bjt)h˜
leading to
εk < ε˜k(b
j
t) ≡
ΔUkt+1 − 2(1− bjt)h˜
c
. (2)
The presence of non-believers in the area reduces incentives to exert high eﬀort. The larger the
fraction of non-believers, the lower the probability for the individual k to exert eﬀort ek = 1, i.e.
ε˜k(b
j
t) is decreasing with 1− bjt . We have ε˜k(0) = (ΔUkt+1 − 2h˜)/c < ε˜k(1) = ΔUkt+1/c.
We see from (1) and (2) that ĥ and h˜ measure the size of some social multiplier eﬀect according
to which small changes in private incentives are ampliﬁed by social interactions (see Becker and
Murphy, 2000). For instance, a small decrease in the cost of education will lead to an increase
in the number of believers who decide to educate, that is larger than without social interactions,
i.e.
∣∣∂ε̂i(bjt)/∂c∣∣ = (ΔU it+1 + 2bjt ĥ)/c2 > ΔU it+1/c2. The reason is that a small decrease of the
cost makes also neighbors choose education. This in turn increases incentives to follow the social
norm5. We will thus say that when ĥ > h˜, respectively ĥ < h˜, the social multiplier is higher,
respectively lower, for believers than for non-believers.
5In fact, we could express the social multiplier if stigmatization costs and reputational beneﬁts were proportional
to the rate of education of believers or non-believers, respectively, living in the neighborhood, denoted by λ̂
j
t ,
respectively λ˜
j
t :
Û jt = p(e)Ut+1(wr) + (1− p(e))Ut+1(wp)− εc(e) + (e− (1− e)) λ̂
j
t ĥ for a believer,
U˜ jt = p(e)Ut+1(wr) + (1− p(e))Ut+1(wp)− εc(e) + (−e+ (1− e)) (1− λ˜
j
t )h˜ otherwise.
Such a speciﬁcation allowing for strategic complementarities would lead to the following thresholds
ε̂i(b
j
t ) ≡
ΔU it+1 + 2λ̂
j
t ĥ
c
and ε˜k(b
j
t ) ≡
ΔUkt+1 − 2(1− λ˜
j
t )h˜
c
.
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2.3 Parents’ location choice
Parents diﬀer with respect to both income and beliefs. Each parent chooses the family’s location
before her child experiences the ability shock and decides how much eﬀort to devote to education.
We make a limited altruism assumption so that parents are concerned by the expected income
of their oﬀspring.6 As it will become clear in the next section while presenting the social norms
dynamics, the location decision of parents gives rise to a particular socioeconomic composition of
each neighborhood and thus plays a key role in the dynamics of believers. Hence, at date t, given
that ε is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], any parent i of generation t−1 with income wz, z = r, p
and a child k who lives in area j has the following preferences:
Û it (wz) = u(wz − ρjt) + a
⎛⎜⎝ ε̂k(b
j
t )∫
0
wrdε+
1∫
ε̂k(b
j
t )
wpdε
⎞⎟⎠ if i is a believer,
U˜ it (wz) = u(wz − ρjt) + a
⎛⎜⎝ ε˜k(b
j
t )∫
0
wrdε+
1∫
ε˜k(b
j
t )
wpdε
⎞⎟⎠ otherwise
with u(.) the instantaneous utility function, ρjt the rent paid to live in area j at date t, a an
altruism parameter. u(.) is bounded, continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and concave
over R+.
We look at the following equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 1 At date t, the urban conﬁguration [ρ∗t , b
1∗
t ] is an equilibrium such that, given her
child’s best educational choice, no parent wants to move.
Letting Δw ≡ (wr − wp), at date t, any parent i endowed with wz must solve the following
program:
Hence, the impact of a small change of c on λ̂
j
t and λ˜
j
t equals
∂λ̂
j
t
∂c
=
∂ε̂i(b
j
t )/∂c
(1− 2ĥ/c)
and
∂(1− λ˜jt )
∂c
=
∂(1− ε̂i(bjt ))/∂c
(1− 2h˜/c)
leading to ∂λ̂
j
t/∂c > ∂ε̂i(b
j
t )/∂c and ∂(1 − λ˜
j
t )/∂c > ∂(1 − ε̂i(bjt ))/∂c when the denominator is positive and less
than 1. The social multiplier equals 2ĥ/c and 2h˜/c, for believers and non-believers, respectively. We do not use
this model because, as we said before, we consider that actions reﬂect imperfectly the distribution of preferences
for social norm in the the whole population.
6In Section 6, we study the implications of the assumption that parents are aﬀected by the neighborhood’s social
norms.
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maxj u(wz − ρjt) + a
[
Δwε̂k(b
j
t) + wp
]
if i is a believer,
maxj u(wz − ρjt) + a
[
Δwε˜k(b
j
t) + wp
]
otherwise.
2.4 Social Norms Dynamics
We restrict our attention to the dynamics of believers, Bt, as the dynamics of non-believers N−Bt
is immediately deduced from the evolution of Bt. Following Akerlof (1980) “[...] if disobedience
is more common, in all likelihood the values responsible for the observance of a social custom are
less likely to be passed on from one generation to the next the greater is the disobedience.” (p.
749), we consider that the number of believers born at date t follow the social norm dynamics
bjt,t+1 − bjt = λ(bjt)− bjt for any j = 1, 2 (3)
with λ(bjt) the rate of education at date t in area j = 1, 2 and b
j
t,t+1 the number of individuals of
generation t, living in area j at date t, and who are believers at date t+1. Hence, when λ(bjt) > b
j
t ,
the ‘education’ social norm spreads in the area j. These dynamics can be viewed as a stability
process. In the long run, the social norm is stable in the sense that the number of individuals
believing in the social norm equal the number of people following the prescribed code of behavior,
i.e. bjt = λ(b
j
t).
7
A remark is worth mentioning. We assume that at each date adults choose their location.
bjt,t+1 in (3) is obtained at an intermediate stage before generation t individuals choose their place
of residence. Hence, bjt,t+1 diﬀers from b
j
t+1 which denotes the number of believers of generation t
once generation t has made its residence choice. We depict the timing of events in Figure 1
Insert Figure 1
According to these dynamics, the generation t with Bt believers becomes adult at date t + 1
with Bt+1 = L
2∑
j=1
bjt,t+1 believers.
In order to obtain the rate of education, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 Children are myopic in the sense that they do not anticipate that when adults
(i) their beliefs may be diﬀerent (ii) and they will pay a rent.
7The literature (see, for example, Akerlof, 1980, or Corneo, 1995) rather considers the following speciﬁcation
bt,t+1 − bt = H(λ(bt) − bt) with H : [−1, 1] −→ R, H ′(.) > 0 and H(0) = 0. We consider a linear speciﬁcation in
order to conduct a tractable analysis of the dynamics.
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Assumption 1 puts aside two diﬃculties. First, while studying the educational choice of eﬀort,
given item (i), we do not need to specify the expected gains of education with respect to proba-
bilities of becoming either a believer or a non-believer during adulthood. Given the social norms
dynamics, the deﬁnition of these probabilities would require additional and ad hoc assumptions.
Second, as expected gains of education do not depend on future rent, children do not have to
anticipate the future urban equilibrium in order to make their choice of educational eﬀort. It
amounts to say that they are not aware of the fact that neighborhood social composition matters
and has some intrinsic value. One could justify item (ii) by saying that children only interact with
the neighborhood population and do not realize that the population may be unevenly distributed
in the city. Hence they consider that belonging to a particular neighborhood has no eﬀect on
their educational eﬀort. We thus assume that individuals expect to pay the cost of opportunity
of land which is normalized to 0. Given parents preferences, Assumption 1 thus implies that both
thresholds ε̂i(b
j
t) and ε˜k(b
j
t) deﬁned in (1) and (2) can be written as follows
ε̂i(b
j
t) = ε̂(b
j
t) =
u(wr)− u(wp) + bjt(2ĥ)
c
∀i, (4)
and ε˜k(b
j
t) = ε˜(b
j
t) =
u(wr)− u(wp)− (1− bjt)(2h˜)
c
,∀k. (5)
Later on, we let Δu ≡ u(wr)− u(wp). Obviously, for any bjt , we have ε˜(bjt) < ε̂(bjt) leading the
rate of education of believers to be higher than that of non-believers.
Assumption 2 Parameters c, wr, wp, h˜, ĥ and the function u(.) are such that (i) Δu/c < 1,
(ii) (c−Δu)/2ĥ < 1, (iii) Δu/2h˜ < 1.
Item (i) amounts to say that, ignoring social norms eﬀects, returns to education are not
suﬃcient to make the unablest individual exert high eﬀort, i.e. Δu− c < 0. Item (ii) tells us that
if the urban area is exclusively inhabited by believers then the unablest believer is willing to exert
high eﬀort. Finally, item (iii) implies that when there are only non-believers in the neighborhod
even the ablest non-believer does not exert high eﬀort. Assumption 2 has some implications on
the impact of the fraction of believers in the neighborhood on the educational rate of both the
believers or the non-believers. Given both items (i) and (ii), we have ε̂(0) < 1 < ε̂(1) ensuring
that the fraction of believers exerting high eﬀort lies between a strictly positive number less than
1 and 1 for any bjt ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, below some threshold, any increase in the number of believers in
the neighborhood strictly increases the number of believers who educate. Any fraction of believers
in the neighborhood above this threshold leads all believers to get education. Furthermore, given
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both items (i) and (iii), we have ε˜(0) < 0 < ε˜(1) < 1. It turns out that the fraction of non-
believers exerting high eﬀort lies between 0 and a strictly positive number lower than 1. Hence, a
minimal fraction of believers is needed to incite non-believers to exert educational eﬀort. Once bjt
has reached this threshold, any further rise of believers in the neighborhood strictly increases the
number of non-believers who decide to educate.
Given that ε is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], we can thus derive the fraction of
children who are educated at date t in area j = 1, 2, denoted by λ(bjt),
λ(bjt) = b
j
t min[̂ε(b
j
t), 1] + (1− bjt)max[0, ε˜(bjt)].
Given (4) and (5), we have for j = 1, 2
λ(bjt) = min
[
(Δu)bjt +
(
bjt
)2
(2ĥ)
c
, bjt
]
+max
[
0,
Δu(1− bjt)− (1− bjt)2(2h˜)
c
]
.
We assume the following
Assumption 3 Parameters c, wr, wp, h˜, ĥ and the function u(.) are such that
c−Δu
2ĥ
> 1− Δu
2h˜
.
Assumption 3 avoids the case where we have for some bjt corner situations for both believers
and non-believers, i.e. there does not exist any bjt such thatmin[̂ε(b
j
t), 1] = 1 andmax[0, ε˜(b
j
t)] = 0.
Assumption 3 thus guarantees that a variation of bjt always leads to a change of the fraction of
children exerting high eﬀort.
Given Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, lettingΔh ≡ ĥ−h˜, A ≡ 1−(Δu/2h˜) and C ≡ (c−Δu)/2ĥ > A,
the fraction of children who educate then equals:
λ(bjt) =
(Δu)bjt +
(
bjt
)2
(2ĥ)
c
when bjt ∈ [0, A] (6)
λ(bjt) =
(
bjt
)2 2Δh
c
+ bjt
4h˜
c
− 2h˜
c
+
Δu
c
when bjt ∈ [A,C] (7)
λ(bjt) = −
(
bjt
)2 2h˜
c
+ bjt(1−
Δu
c
+
4h˜
c
) +
Δu− 2h˜
c
when bjt ∈ [C, 1] . (8)
Hence, when the fraction of believers is low, i.e. bjt ∈ [0, A] , incentives to follow the ‘education’
social norm are weak, making a fraction of believers, those endowed with a high skill, exert high
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eﬀort. By contrast, incentives to follow the ‘no education’ social norm are high for non-believers
and none of them educate. The rate of education is then given by (6). When the fraction of
believers is higher, i.e. bjt ∈ [A,C], a higher fraction of believers educate and non-believers
endowed with a high skill exert high eﬀort. The rate of education is given by (7). Finally, when
the fraction of believers is high, i.e. bjt ∈ [C, 1], it turns out that all believers follow the ‘education’
social norm. A fraction of non-believers also exert high eﬀort.
Let us stress that if items (ii) and (iii) of Assumption 2 were not satisﬁed then (8) and (6)
respectively would not be considered and the dynamics would only be deﬁned by (7). In such a
case, as it will become clearer in Section 4, the model would not admit a multiplicity of steady
states. Finally, Assumption 3 guarantees that there does not exist some bjt < 1 such that λ(b
j
t) = 1.
3 Short-Run Equilibrium: Cultural Balance versus Cul-
tural Divide
According to Deﬁnition 1, the type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on the identity of
individuals who are most willing to pay to live in a better neighborhood. Without loss of generality,
we deﬁne area 1 as the one inhabited by a higher fraction of believers, i.e. b1t ≥ b2t ≡ (Bt/L)− b1t .
In order to study the equilibrium, it will be convenient to examine the bid-rent function which
measures the willingness for a parent with income wz, z = r, p to pay to live in area 1. It is denoted
by ρ̂z(b1t ) and ρ˜
z(b1t ), for a believer and non-believer respectively, with income wz, z = r, p. We
assume without loss of generality that the rent in area 2 equals the opportunity cost of building
a house which is normalized to 0. Given (4) and (5), the bid rent of a parent with wz can be
expressed as follows:
u(wz)− u(wz − ρ̂z(b1t )) = a
(
2b1t −
Bt
L
)(
2ĥ
c
)
Δw for a believer (9)
u(wz)− u(wz − ρ˜z(b1t )) = a
(
2b1t −
Bt
L
)(
2h˜
c
)
Δw otherwise. (10)
In a ﬁrst step, we assume that the instantaneous utility function u(.) is linear so that the slope
of the bid rent is not impacted by any income eﬀect8. From (9) and (10), we have for any z = r, p
8The implications of a concave utility assumption are considered in Section 6.
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ρ̂z(b1t ) = ρ̂(b
1
t ) = a
(
2b1t −
Bt
L
)(
2ĥ
c
)
Δw and (11)
ρ˜z(b1t ) = ρ˜(b
1
t ) = a
(
2b1t −
Bt
L
)(
2h˜
c
)
Δw. (12)
Whatever their beliefs, parents are willing to pay to neighbor individuals who believe in the
norm ‘exerting an eﬀort at school’. The higher 2b1t − (Bt/L) the more attractive is area 1. The
reason is that given that parents value the expected income of their oﬀspring they want to live
in the neighborhood that most promotes education whatever their beliefs. Given this limited
altruism assumption, parents who are non-believers are willing to pay to locate in the neigborhood
of believers as it maximizes the probability that their child has a high expected income. In Section
6, we relax the limited altruism assumption so that parents take care of the neighborhood social
norm implying that it may be costly for parents if their child does not obey the social norm they
believe in.
We introduce a stability condition which will prove useful in order to select an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 Without loss of generality, let us assume that Bt/2L ≤ 1. Consider an equilibrium
[ρ∗t , b
1∗
t ] with Bt/2L ≤ b1∗t ≤ 1. Take a small ν > 0. The equilibrium [ρ∗t , b1∗t ] is stable if after a
perturbation leading to b1t = b
1∗
t + ν or b
1
t = b
1∗
t − ν, there are non-believers, believers respectively,
in area 2 who are able to outbid believers, non-believers respectively, in order to live in area 1.
Hence, the stability condition hinges on the ranking of slopes of the bid rents which can be
expressed as follows:
R(ĥ, ρt) ≡
dρ̂(b1t )
db1t
∣∣∣∣
Ut(wz)=U
= a
4ĥ
c
Δw and (13)
R(h˜, ρt) ≡
dρ˜(b1t )
db1t
∣∣∣∣
Ut(wz)=U
= a
4h˜
c
Δw. (14)
leading to
R(ĥ, ρt)  R(h˜, ρt) if and only if ĥ  h˜. (15)
We can ﬁrst oﬀer the following
Proposition 1 The symmetric equilibrium [ρ∗t = 0, b
1∗
t = Bt/2L], called culturally-balanced, al-
ways exists. It is the unique stable equilibrium if and only if ĥ ≤ h˜.
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Proofs are relegated to the Appendix. There is always an equilibrium where the population
of believers is distributed evenly among both areas. The mix of social norms is the same in both
neighborhoods. It turns out that individuals, whatever their income and beliefs, are indiﬀerent
between the two residential areas. The equilibrium rate of education, that is λ(Bt/2L), is the
same in both urban areas and is given by one of the three equations (6), (7) and (8) depending
on the value of Bt/2L.
Let us consider a migration of ν believers from area 2 to area 1 and a migration of ν non-
believers in the reverse direction. When the social multiplier is higher for believers implying that
R(ĥ, ρt) > R(h˜, ρt), believers ﬁnd it worthwhile to migrate to area 1 preventing the culturally-
balanced equilibrium from being restored. Otherwise, non-believers are able to outbid believers
to live in urban area 1, thus correcting the perturbation.
The following Proposition focuses on another type of equilibrium
Proposition 2 A culturally-divided equilibrium exists if and only if ĥ > h˜. If Bt < L, b
1∗
t = Bt/L
and b2∗t = 0. If Bt > L, b
1∗
t = 1 and b
2∗
t = (Bt/L)− 1. It is always stable.
When the social multiplier is higher for believers, another type of urban equilibrium, called
culturally-divided equilibrium, exists. It is such that the fraction of believers is larger in area 1
than in area 2. Two types of cultural clash which are depicted in Figure 2 arise. The city on the
left arises when the whole population is comprised of a majority of non-believers, i.e. Bt ≤ L.
All believers are located in area 1, that is b1t = Bt/L. Population in area 2 unanimously rejects
education as b2t = 0 and deprives the youth of incentives to educate. Depending on Bt/L, the
equilibrium rate of education in area 1, λ(b1t ), is given by one of the three equalities (6) or (7) or (8).
Whereas the educational rate in urban area 2 is nil. The city on the right arises when Bt > L. The
cultural clash is such that urban area 1 is only inhabited by believers who unanimously promote
education. Both social norms are present in urban area 2. We have λ(b1t ) = 1 and the equilibrium
rate of education in area 2 is given by either (6), or (7) or (8).
Insert Figure 2
As far as we know, the empirical evidence on peer eﬀects in education does not allow to draw
any clear-cut conclusion about the magnitude of ĥ with respect to h˜. It is thus diﬃcult to claim
that one type of urban equilibrium is more likely to arise than the other one.
For instance, Bishop (2003)’s results suggest that ĥ and h˜ have the same magnitude. Using data
from the Educational Excellence Alliance’s survey of Student Culture, Bishop (2003) ﬁnds that
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the increase of harassment has the same magnitude whether a student is above or below the school
norm: “[...] students who were 1.5 SDs above the mean [...] on GPA and the commitment indices
were harassed 43 times a year, a 42 percent increase from the baseline student. Those hanging
out in cliques that were 1.5 SDs below the school mean on GPA and academic commitment were
harassed about 39 times a year a 30 percent increase over the baseline level.” (p.51, Bishop, 2003).
However, it is likely that pupils attending schools such as KIPP academies and other char-
ter schools acquire preferences such that ĥ > h˜. Although no empirical study has tested this
hypothesis, it is recognized that these schools enforce pro-learning social norms and make their
pupils acquire pro-education preferences (see Angrist et al. 2013 or Curto and Fryer, 2014). More
generally, schools are social institutions that promote social goals and aﬀect students’ identity.
According to Akerlof and Kranton (2002), schools can act in order to delineate prescriptions for
student behavior and ensure that students identify with the school and its ideals.
4 Social Norms Dynamics in the Culturally-Divided City
We analyze the dynamics of social norms under segregation. We thus assume that ĥ > h˜ leading
the cultural-divided city to arise at each date t. From (3), we have:
Bt+1 = Bt + L
2∑
j=1
(λ(bjt)− bjt). (16)
The ‘education’ social norm dynamics when the culturally-divided equilibrium arises at each
date t can be expressed as follows:
Bt+1
⎧⎨⎩ = Bt + L
[
λ
(
Bt
L
)− Bt
L
+ λ (0)− 0] when Bt < L
= Bt + L
[
λ (1)− 1 + λ (Bt
L
− 1)− (Bt
L
− 1)] when L ≤ Bt ≤ 2L.
Given (6) and (8), we have λ (0) = 0 and λ (1) = 1. We obtain:
Bt+1
⎧⎨⎩ = Lλ
(
Bt
L
)
when Bt < L
= Lλ
(
Bt
L
− 1)+ L when L ≤ Bt ≤ 2L
where λ (Bt/L) and λ ((Bt/L)− 1) are given by equations (6)-(8). In this dynamic setup, we have
potentially multiple long-run equilibria. We will say that a long-run equilibrium is locally stable
if for any Bt in the vicinity of the steady state the population of believers converges to the steady
state.9
9We have thus two diﬀerent notions of stability, the dynamic one and the spatial one which is speciﬁed in
Deﬁnition 2. When we speak about the stability of the steady-state equilibrium we refer to the dynamic one.
17
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
We can then oﬀer the following:
Proposition 3 When a culturally-divided equilibrium emerges at each date t, there are three
locally stable long-run equilibria: BCD1 = 0, B
CD
2 = L, B
CD
3 = 2L.
Proposition 3 allows us to depict the following social norms dynamics implied by a culturally-
divided city. The complete characterization of the dynamical system is provided in the Appendix.
Insert Figure 3
The dynamics exhibit three history-dependent stable steady states. Also depicted in the graph
are two unstable steady states B1 and B

2 with 0 < B

1 < L and L < B

2 < 2L. Consider the
case where initially all believers inhabit area 1, i.e. 0 ≤ B0 ≤ L. When 0 ≤ B0 ≤ B1 , the initial
number of believers is not suﬃcient to generate incentives that lead to a spread of the ‘education’
social norm. Hence, in the long run, the whole population becomes non-believer and depreciates
education. When B1 ≤ B0 ≤ L, the city reaches a steady state such that the area 1 is populated
exclusively by believers. A cultural clash arises in the city as area 2 promotes exclusively the
‘no education’ social norm. If now the number of believers is larger than L then, according to
Proposition 2, believers are located in both urban areas. When L ≤ B0 ≤ B2 , believers in area
2 are not numerous enough to promote the ‘education’ social norm and thus urban area 2 ends
up with no believers in the long run. On the whole, when B1 ≤ B0 ≤ B2 , in the long run,
inhabitants in urban area 2 unanimously depreciate education and fall in a poverty trap. When
B2 ≤ B0 ≤ 2L, the culturally-divided equilibrium is such that believers in area 2 are numerous
enough to generate incentives to invest into education. The number of believers expands in the
whole population and in the long run, the city is inhabited by believers and the level of education
is maximized and equal to BCD3 = 2L.
10
For each steady state, the long-run distribution of income is the following:
at BCD1 , N
r = 0 and Np = 2L
at BCD2 , N
r = L and Np = L
at BCD3 , N
r = 2L and Np = 0.
10In the graph, B1 ∈ [LA,LC] and B2 ∈ [LA+ L,LC + L]. This may not be always the case. However, we
show that B1 ∈ [LA,L] and B2 ∈ [L+ LA, 2L] and when B1 ∈ [LA,LC] , respectively B1 ∈ [LC,L] , we have
B2 ∈ [LA+ L,LC + L] , respectively B2 ∈ [LC + L, 2L] .
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Obviously, the steady state where the ‘no education’ social norm is the rule of behavior will lead
to the highest poverty rate while the steady state promoting education will lead to a homogeneously
rich population. For these two steady states, the education rate is the same in both urban areas
and the rent paid in area 1 becomes nil. Moreover, the city reaching BCD2 is characterized by
an intermediate number of poor people and exhibits an uneven distribution of education as both
urban areas are opposed with respect to the prevailing social norm.
Hence, following Crane (1991) terminology, the dynamics exhibit epidemics of social norm.
The ‘education’ social norm spreads in one urban area or in the entire city if the population of
believers reaches a threshold value. On the contrary, if the population of believers stays below
a threshold the population tends to a low-level equilibrium with the ‘no education’ social norm
prevailing in the city. Given these tipping dynamics, small diﬀerences in initial conditions may lead
to dramatic diﬀerences in education rates and inequality dynamics. This result is consistent with
empirical ﬁndings of existence of tipping points. A ﬁrst strategy adopted by Crane (1991) to test
the existence of tipping dynamics was to estimate the eﬀects of neighborhood quality on dropping
out and teenage childbearing. Crane (1991) shows that this relationship is nonlinear, leading
neighborhood eﬀects to be much larger in urban ghettos than in more favorable neighborhoods.
In his review of the US literature, Galster (2002) concludes that neighborhood poverty has no
eﬀect on crime and school drop-out when the poverty rate does not exceed 20% whereupon the
externality grows rapidly until the poverty rate reaches approximately 40%. Above this last
threshold, subsequent increases in the poverty are innocuous. A second approach by Card, Mas
and Rothstein (2008) in order to test for race-based tipping dynamics uses decadal changes in
neighborhood racial composition. They ﬁnd strong evidence of tipping over 1970s, 1980s and
1990s with a distribution of tipping points ranging from 5% to 20% minority share.
5 Does a Culturally-Balanced City Lead to Higher Edu-
cation?
Let us now study the dynamics under integration. Given (16), when b1t = b
2
t = Bt/2L at each
date t then the social norm dynamics writes down:
Bt+1 = Bt + 2L
(
λt
(
Bt
2L
)
− Bt
2L
)
where λ (Bt/2L) is given by equations (6)-(8).
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Proposition 4 When a culturally-balanced equilibrium emerges at each date t, there are two
locally stable long-run equilibria BCB1 = 0, B
CB
2 = 2L.
The dynamics exhibit two history-dependent stable steady states. If the city starts with a
population of believers above the threshold B depicted in Figure 4 then incentives to exert high
eﬀort are suﬃciently high in both urban areas leading the ‘education’ social norm to spread in
the population. Hence, in the long run, all individuals believe in this social norm, BCB2 = 2L. On
the contrary, when the initial population of believers is below B then the ‘education’ social norm
vanishes. In the long run, the whole city population adheres to the ‘no education’ social norm.
Insert Figure 4
Each steady state is characterized by a particular long-run distribution:
at BCB1 = 0, N
r = 0 and Np = N
at BCB2 = 2L, N
r = N and Np = 0.
We now turn to the issue whether the culturally-balanced city always perform better than a
culturally-divided one in the long run regarding to the rate of education. The following ﬁgure is a
superposition of social norms dynamics depicted in both Figures 3 and 4 and exhibits a particular
case that may arise depending on parameter values of c, Δu, h˜, ĥ. The Appendix provides a
characterization of all possible cases.
Insert Figure 5
Depending on initial conditions, the culturally-balanced city and the culturally-divided city
may reach very diﬀerent steady states. For instance, consider the case where B1 ≤ B ≤ B2 and
let us start with B0 such that B

1 < B0 < B
. Hence, the culturally-divided city and culturally-
balanced city, reaches the steady-state BCD2 = L and B
CB
1 = 0 respectively. The culturally-
divided city performs better in the long run than the culturally-balanced city because in case of
concentration of the ‘education’ social norm in area 1 the initial number of believers is suﬃcient
for the ‘education’ social norm to spread in urban area 1 while in case of cultural balancedness the
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same number of believers is too disseminated in the city for the “education” social norm to spread.
However, if the economy starts with B0 such that B
 < B0 < B

2 , the culturally-balanced city
would perform better than the culturally-divided one. The culturally-balanced city would end-
up with a maximized rate of education while the culturally-divided city would exhibit long-run
inequality between both urban areas.
Furthermore, Figure 5 highlights that a culturally-balanced city may involve a dynamic trade-
oﬀ, that is the educational rate would be maximized in the short run but would be lower than
under segregation in the long run. Given the speciﬁcation of the social norms dynamics, Bt+1
equals the number of people who educate at date t. Hence we can see that if B > L which arises
if Δh < c− 2Δu, then there are values of Bt such that the rate of educational is higher at date t
in the culturally balanced city but converges to the steady state BCB1 = 0 rather than B
CD
2 = L.
11
We are not aware of any empirical evidence supporting that integration leads to a general
erosion of norms in favor of education. The strategy in order to test this result requires that,
once an integration policy is implemented, the urban equilibrium remains integrated along the
transitional path of social norms dynamics. However, the diﬃculty is that integration policies
do not only impact local externalities but also induce some inhabitants to respond by leaving
urban areas targeted by these policies. White ﬂight caused by desegregation plans implemented
in the US is a good illustration that integration policies cause migration of white families to whiter
urban areas (see for instance Reber, 2005, for empirical evidence of the eﬀects of court-ordered
desegregation plans on white ﬂight).
Nonetheless, the potential negative eﬀect of integration is consistent with empirical ﬁndings of
social norms inﬂuence that once the share of disadvantaged populations exceeds some threshold
then negative eﬀects occur (see Galster, 2002 and Galster 2010, for reviews). Hence, when there are
non-linear relationships between neighborhood poverty rates and individual behavioral outcomes,
poverty deconcentration policies should proceed with caution when implementing the degree of
neighborhood social mix. According to Galster (2002), if behavioral problems are related to
neighborhood poverty rates within a range of approximately 15-40% of poverty rate, “This implies
that net social beneﬁts will be larger if neighborhoods with greater than roughly 15% poverty
rates are replaced with (an appropriately larger number) of neighborhoods having less than 15%
poverty rates. However, net social beneﬁts will be smaller if neighborhoods with greater than about
40% poverty rates are replaced with (an appropriately larger number) of neighborhoods having
between about 15-40% poverty rates. Put more bluntly in policy terms, unless very low-poverty
11See Bénabou (1996a) for an elegant formal treatment of this dynamic trade-oﬀ.
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neighborhoods can be opened up for occupation by the poor, deconcentration eﬀorts should halt,
because merely transferring the poor from high- to moderate-poverty neighborhoods is likely to
be socially ineﬃcient.” (p. 322, Galster, 2002).
Finally, a possible empirical investigation of our model would be to see whether the tipping
dynamics depend on the degree of urban segregation. Indeed, our model highlights that the
socioeconomic organization of the city drives speciﬁc dynamics with particular threshold values,
although this result relies on particular parameter values and on the speciﬁcation of the model.
6 Extended Altruism, Income Eﬀect and Multiple Urban
Equilibria
We extend the model so that (i) parents are also aﬀected by the neighborhood’s norms of education
and (ii) the utility is strictly concave. We study the implications of these assumptions on the urban
equilibria that emerge. The characteristics of the social norms dynamics are not modiﬁed by these
assumptions. Parents’ preferences are now written as follows:
Û it (wz) = u(wz − ρjt) + a
⎛⎜⎝ ε̂k(b
j
t )∫
0
(
wr + b
j
t ĥ
)
dε+
1∫
ε̂k(b
j
t )
(
wp − bjt ĥ
)
dε
⎞⎟⎠ if i is a believer,
U˜ it (wz) = u(wz − ρjt) + a
⎛⎜⎝ ε˜k(b
j
t )∫
0
(
wr − (1− bjt)h˜
)
dε+
1∫
ε˜k(b
j
t )
(
wp + (1− bjt)h˜
)
dε
⎞⎟⎠ otherwise.
This speciﬁcation amounts to say that any parent beneﬁts from reputation if her child follows
the social norm he believes in and suﬀers from stigmatization in case her child deviates from the
social norm. Straightforward computations lead to the following slopes of bid rents
R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) = a
4ĥ
cu′(wz − ρt)
[
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
]
for z = r, p and (17)
R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) = a
4h˜
cu′(wz − ρt)
[
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
]
for z = r, p. (18)
Hence, both dimensions of heterogeneity, income and beliefs, impact their willingness to pay
to live in area 1. Taking beliefs as given, bid rent is steeper for a rich parent. This is due to the
concavity of u(.). Thus a rich agent outbids the poorer one. If now beliefs change, the bid-rent
diﬀerential between a believer endowed with wz and a non-believer with wz′ can be expressed as
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follows
R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt)−R(wz′ , h˜, ρt, Bt) =
4a
cu′(wz − ρt)
[
(ĥ− h˜)(Δw +Δu− c
2
) + 2ĥ2
Bt
L
+ 2h˜2(2− Bt
L
)
+
[
1− u
′(wz − ρt)
u′(wz′ − ρt)
] [
Δw +Δu− c
2
− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)
]]
. (19)
It turns out that new incentives drive the location choice. If both individuals have the same
income, the diﬀerential is given by the ﬁrst line of (19) where two forces are stressed: weighted
net returns to education denoted by (ĥ − h˜)(Δw + Δu − (c/2)) and social norms eﬀect equal
to 2ĥ2(Bt/L) + 2h˜
2(2 − (Bt/L)). First, when the returns to education are positive, i.e. Δw +
Δu − (c/2) ≥ 0, and the social multiplier is higher for believers, i.e. ĥ ≥ h˜, both forces make
the rent diﬀerential be positive. It turns out that believers ﬁnd more attractive to live in urban
area 1 and outbid non-believers. Second, when returns to education are negative and the social
multiplier is higher for non-believers, believers outbid non-believers to live in urban area 1. The
logic behind this result is slightly diﬀerent than in the ﬁrst case as, now, non-believers ﬁnd more
attractive to live in urban area 2. However, it is also possible to have cases where both forces act
in opposite direction and make the bid-rent diﬀerential is negative. When returns to education
are positive, non-believers may be more willing to live in urban area 1 than believers. This
case can arise when the social multiplier is higher for non-believers, i.e. ĥ < h˜, valuing more
the weighted net returns to education and when the maximal value of the social norm eﬀect is
lower than the negative weighted returns to education, i.e. (ĥ − h˜)(2Δw − (c/2)) + 4h˜2 < 0. In
such a case, non-believers are eager to suﬀer more from stigmatization in order to beneﬁt from a
better environment for education. When returns to education are negative, believers may be more
willing to live in urban area 2. This case arises when the social multiplier is higher for believers
and the maximal positive social norm eﬀect is outweighed by the negative weighted returns to
education, i.e. (ĥ − h˜)(2Δw − (c/2) + 4(ĥ + h˜)) + 4h˜2 < 0. In such a case, given stigmatization
costs and reputation beneﬁts are modest, believers prefer their oﬀspring to live in a low-education
neighborhood environment.
If now we consider a believer and a non-believer diﬀering with respect to their income the two
last brackets of (19) must also be taken into account to derive the sign of the bid-rent diﬀerential.
Both last brackets capture the income eﬀect generated by the concavity of u(.). Hence, when
individuals diﬀer with respect to both dimensions, it is likelier that bid-rent functions cross more
than once and that multiple stable urban equilibria arise.
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We can then oﬀer the following:
Proposition 5 At any date t,
(i) The culturally-balanced city [ρ∗t = 0, b
1∗
t = Bt/2L] always exists. It is stable if and only if
R(wz, ĥ, 0, Bt) < R(wz′ , h˜, 0, Bt) for z 	= z′ = r, p.
(ii) For some values of c, wr, wp, h˜, ĥ, a and depending on the distribution of income and beliefs,
a culturally-divided equilibrium with b1∗t > b
2∗
t exists and is stable.
(iii) For some values of c, wr, wp, h˜, ĥ, a, Bt/L, the culturally-balanced equilibrium is stable and
the culturally-divided equilibrium exists.
This Proposition highlights a richer pattern of urban equilibria. According to item (i), the
existence of the culturally-balanced equilibrium still holds. Stability requires that non-believers
are able to outbid believers in order to counterbalance the perturbation. Item (ii) stresses various
conﬁgurations of culturally-divided equilibria. Precisely, existence and stability of the culturally-
divided equilibrium rely ﬁrst on values taken by the slopes of the bid-rent function, second, on the
demographic characteristics of the population, i.e. the size of both the population of believers and
non-believers. The Appendix provides the conditions on the bid-rent diﬀerential and demographics
so that a culturally-divided city exists.
Insert Figure 6
We denote by N̂ zt (N̂
z,j
t ), respectively N˜
z
t (N˜
z,j
t ), the number of parents with income wz who are
believers, non-believers, in the whole population (in area j). Figure 6 displays two conﬁgurations
of a culturally-divided city that possibly exist when the population of rich believers is smaller than
L and when the rich non-believers are able to outbid poor believers. In addition to the cultural
divide, the city on the left exhibits income segregation where all the poor live in area 2. Hence,
area 1 is inhabited by a larger fraction of believers than in area 2 and it is also homogeneously rich.
Nevertheless, area 2 is populated by a fraction of believers that helps individuals to get education.
Depending on the value of bjt , the equilibrium rate of education in area j, λ(b
j
t), is given by either
(6), or (7) or (8). As b1t > b
2
t , we have λ(b
1
t ) > λ(b
2
t ).
The city on the right arises when the whole population is comprised of a majority of poor non-
believers, i.e. N˜pt > L. Both the rich and the believers populations are located in area 1, that is
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b1t = Bt/L. Depending on Bt/L, the equilibrium rate of education in area 1, λ(b
1
t ), is given by one
of the three equalities (6) or (7) or (8). The population in area 2 unanimously rejects education
as b2t = 0. According to (6), no non-believer educates. Furthermore, area 2 concentrates poverty.
In both urban conﬁgurations, the rich population has a larger opportunity to beneﬁt from better
neighborhood eﬀects than the poorer one.
On the contrary, when the poor believers outbid rich non-believers, a diﬀerent conﬁguration
of the culturally-divided city may arise where all believers segregate in area 1 leading area 2 to
promote the opposite social norm. This cultural clash leads to an educational gap such that
λ(b2t ) = 0 and λ(Bt/L) is given by (6), (7) or (8) depending on the level of Bt/L. This urban
equilibrium is depicted below.
Insert Figure 7
Let us mention that an increase in the income inequality may lead to a dramatic change of
the urban conﬁguration. The urban conﬁguration in Figure 7 is obtained when R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt)−
R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) < 0. An increase in income inequality, assimilated to an increase in the income
gap between wr and wp, can reverse the ranking between the slopes of both bid-rent curves, i.e.
R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) − R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > 0. It thus turns out that the city on the left of Figure 6 can
emerge. Hence, an increase in income inequality can lead to a more balanced distribution of
believers in the whole city.
Finally, when bid rents cross more than once, an urban conﬁguration where poor believers and
rich non-believers are both indiﬀerent between living in area 1 or area 2 exists. All rich believers
who are the highest bidders live in area 1 while the poor non-believers who are the lowest bidders
inhabit area 2. It is depicted below.12
Insert Figure 8
In the Appendix we provide a numerical example highlighting that bid-rent functions can cross
more than once giving rise to multiple stable urban equilibria.
Several remarks about the bid-rent diﬀerential are worth mentioning. First, an increase in
12The interesting issue of selecting a particular equilibrium among a set of stable equilibria is beyond the scope
of our paper.
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returns to education can also aﬀect the bid-rent diﬀerential. Formally, we have
∂
R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt)−R(wz′ , h˜, ρt, Bt)
∂(Δw +Δu− c
2
)
=
a4
c
[
ĥ− h˜
u′(wz − ρt)
+
1
u′(wz − ρt)
− 1
u′(wz′ − ρt)
]
highlighting that a marginal increase in returns to education has two eﬀects: one being the change
in the weighted net returns to education and the second being the change in the income eﬀect.
Depending on the income gap and the diﬀerence between ĥ − h˜, this derivative may be positive
or negative. What is important to stress is that a change in returns to education can reverse the
ranking of the bid-rent slopes and lead to a dramatic change of the city. Second, the bid-rent
diﬀerential being time-dependent, the urban equilibrium may change along the transitional path.
Depending on the short-run dynamics of Bt, the sign of the bid-rent diﬀerential can change leading
the urban conﬁguration to be modiﬁed.
Finally, the bid-rent diﬀerential (19) sheds light on the design of public policies favoring social
integration. Imagine that parameters are such that the city is culturally-divided but, in both
the short run and the long run, integration is preferable in order to maximize education. Hence,
a central authority would have to design a public policy that would restore the stability of the
culturally-balanced city. According to (19), one can inﬂuence the income eﬀect. Housing subsidies
targeted on the poor could make poor non-believers more willing than rich believers to reside in
area 1. The urban area 1 would then be inhabited by both poor non-believers and poor believers
providing the former more incentives to educate.13
7 Conclusion
In a multicommunity model, we study how social norms on educational behavior spread in the city.
When young, any individual who believes in a social norm has to determine her educational eﬀort
depending on some peer pressure produced by the fraction of people in the neighborhood believing
in the same social norm. When an adult, any individual chooses the place of residence for the
whole family taking into account the educational prospect of her oﬀspring. At each date, it turns
out that multiple urban equilibria arise. First, there exists the culturally-balanced equilibrium
13The Moving to Opportunity Program, Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program or the Low-Income Tax
Credit are examples of such housing-subsidies programs implemented in the US.
Of course, it would be eﬀective to change social norms. Charter schools that feature a long-school day, an
extended school year and strict behavior norms aim to ﬁght against social norms discrediting education (see recent
works of Angrist et al., 2013 and Curto and Fryer, 2014, on evaluation of the causal impact of these policies on
academic achievement).
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where all urban areas are similar with respect to the produced neighborhood eﬀects, that is to
the fraction of people obeying a particular social norm. Second, there may also exist culturally-
divided equilibria such that the composition of social norms followed by the population diﬀers
among urban areas. In particular, some culturally-divided equilibria with a dramatic cultural
contrast may arise: either all believers, or all non-believers, live in the same urban area. We
then study the social norms dynamics implied by the culturally-divided city. We show that the
dynamics exhibit epidemics so that if the fraction of people believing in a particular social norm
is above a certain threshold then this social norm spreads in the urban area and possibly in the
whole city. We also show that for some initial conditions the culturally-divided city experiences
higher education in the long run than the culturally-balanced city.
Although special attention has been paid to education, this model could also be applied to
studying social problems such as drug consumption, teenage pregnancy, crime activities, etc. and
their diﬀusion in the city. In particular, the dynamic setup can help understand why public policies
(punishment policies for instance) may be ineﬀective to ﬁght against social pathologies because
of the strong inﬂuence of the past. The model could also justify the fact that integration policies
could be good substitutes to ﬁght against social problems.
Finally, this model relies on the speciﬁc dynamic mechanism that the social norm expands if
the number of people following it exceeds the number of believers. Relaxing this assumption would
allow us to extend the model in various ways. First, we could introduce cultural transmission à la
Bisin-Verdier (2001) and study the interactions between the endogenous formation of a neighbor-
hood and the incentives to transmit tastes for a particular social norm. Second, Acemoglu and
Jackson (2012) studies another evolution process of social norms relying on agents’ interpretations
about the past. It would then be worth investigating a model where endogenous urban segregation
shapes the information set of individuals and thus inﬂuences how history determines the evolution
of social norms.
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Figure 1: Timing of events.
Figure 2: Two cases of culturally-divided city. On the left, Bt ≤ L, on the right Bt > L. B,
respectively NB, denotes the believer, respectively non-believer, population.
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Figure 3: Social norms dynamics in the culturally-divided city.
Figure 4: Social norms dynamics in the culturally-balanced city.
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Figure 5: Comparing dynamics under cultural divide and cultural balancedness.
Figure 6: Two cases of culturally-divided city when R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) for all ρt
and Bt. R̂, R˜, P̂ , P˜ denote the rich believers, rich non-believers, poor believers, poor non-believers,
populations. On the left, N̂ rt ≥ Bt/L and N̂ rt + N˜ rt ≥ L. On the right, N˜pt > L.
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Figure 7: A culturally-divided city when R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) < R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) for all ρt and Bt.
Population is such that Bt < L and N˜
p
t < L.
Figure 8: An urban conﬁguration when bid-rent curves cross more than once. Both poor believers
and rich non-believers are indiﬀerent between the two areas.
34
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Existence. It is always possible to split the believers’ population such that b1t = b
2
t =
Bt/2L. According to (11) and (12), we have ρ̂(Bt/2L) = ρ˜(Bt/2L) = 0. Hence, no one has an
incentive to move.
Stability. Consider the perturbation ν > 0 that leads to b′1t = (Bt + ν)/2L and b
′2
t = (Bt −
ν)/2L. Let us consider the case ĥ ≥ h˜. According to (15), we have ρ̂((Bt+ν)/2L) > ρ˜((Bt+ν)/2L)
if and only if ĥ > h˜ Hence all rich believers migrate to area 1 implying the culturally-balanced
equilibrium to be unstable. While we get ρ̂((Bt + ν)/2L) < ρ˜((Bt + ν)/2L) if and only if ĥ < h˜,
implying that non-believers migrate to area 1, thus restoring the culturally-balanced equilibrium.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. According to (15), we have
ρ̂(b1t ) > ρ˜(b
1
t ) for any b
1
t ∈]Bt/2L,min{Bt/L, 1}] if and only if ĥ > h˜.
Hence, when ρt = ρ̂(min{Bt/L, 1}) nobody has an incentive to move. The duple [ρ̂(min{Bt/L, 1}), b1t =
min{Bt/L, 1}] is thus an equilibrium. Whatever the small perturbation of the area 1 population,
believers still strictly prefer to live in urban area 1. This equilibrium is stable.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From (6)-(8) and (16), the dynamics of a culturally-divided equilibrium are characterized
as follows:
B

t+1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(Δu)Bt+
B2t
L
(2ĥ)
c
when Bt ∈ [0, LA]
B2t
L
2Δh
c
+Bt
4h˜
c
+ L
(
Δu−(2h˜)
c
)
when Bt ∈ [LA,LC]
−B2t
L
(2h˜)
c
+Bt(1− Δuc + 4h˜c ) + L
(
Δu−2h˜
c
)
when Bt ∈ [LC,L]
B2t
L
2ĥ
c
+Bt
(
Δu−4ĥ
c
)
+ L (2ĥ)−Δu
c
+ L when Bt ∈ [L,L+ LA]
B2t
L
2Δh
c
+ 2Bt
(
2h˜−2Δh
c
)
+ L
(
2Δh
c
− 6h˜
c
+ Δu
c
+ 1
)
when Bt ∈ [L+ LA,L+ LC]
−B2t
L
2h˜
c
+Bt(1− Δuc + 8h˜c ) + L
(
2Δu−8h˜
c
)
when Bt ∈ [L+ LC, 2L].
B

t+1(Bt) is a continuous function of Bt. It is easy to check that B

t+1(Bt) is increasing over
[0, 2L]. Further, B

t+1(0) = 0. From Assumption 2, we know that B

′
t+1(0) = Δu/c < 1. Hence,
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lim
Bt→0+
(
B

t+1(Bt)−Bt
)
< 0. We haveB

t+1(L) = L. FromAssumption 2, we have 0 < lim
Bt→L−
B

′
t+1(Bt) =
1− (Δu/c) < 1 and 0 < lim
Bt→L+
B

′
t+1(Bt) = Δu/c < 1. Hence, B

t+1(Bt) must cross the 45
◦ line at
Bt = L from above, formally we must have lim
Bt→L−
(
B

t+1(Bt)−Bt
)
> 0 and lim
Bt→L+
(
B

t+1(Bt)−Bt
)
<
0. We have B

t+1(2L) = 2L. From Assumption 2, we know that 0 < B

′
t+1(2L) = 1 − (Δu/c) < 1.
Hence, B

t+1(Bt) must cross the 45
◦ line at Bt = 2L from above, formally lim
Bt→2L
(
B

t+1(Bt)−Bt
)
>
0. As B

t+1(0) = 0, lim
Bt→0+
(
B

t+1(Bt)−Bt
)
< 0, and given that B

t+1 crosses twice the the 45
◦ line
from above at Bt = L and Bt = 2L, it must also cross twice the 45
◦ line from below. We deduce
that there exist B1 and B

2 with 0 < B

1 < L < B

2 < 2L such that B

t+1(B

1 ) = B

1 and
B

t+1(B

2 ) = B

2 .
Furthermore, we can provide some information about B1 and B

2 :
(i) We have B1 > LA and B

2 > L+ LA. It amounts to show that B

t+1(LA) < LA which is
equivalent to B

t+1(L+ LA) < L+ LA. Hence, B

t+1(LA) < LA can be written as follows
Δu
c
+
A(2ĥ)
c
< 1.
Given that A ≡ 1− (Δu/2h˜) we have
Δu
c
+
(
2ĥ
c
− Δu
2h˜
∗ (2ĥ)
c
)
< 1
which is equivalent to
Δu
c
(
1− ĥ
h˜
)
+
(
2ĥ
c
)
< 1
which can be written as
1
Δu
c
(
−Δh
h˜
)
+
(
2ĥ
c
) > 1.
Multiplying both the numerator and denominator of the LHS of this inequality by c/2ĥ leads to
c
2ĥ
Δu
(2ĥ)
(
−Δh
h˜
)
+ 1
> 1
which is equivalent to
c
2ĥ
− Δu
2ĥ
> 1− Δu
2h˜
which is Assumption 3. Hence, the result.
(ii) If B

t+1(LC) ≥ LC ⇔ Bt+1(L+ LC) ≥ L+ LC ⇔ (C)2 L2Δhc + CL4h˜c + L
(
Δu−2h˜
c
)
≥ LC
then LA ≤ B1 ≤ LC and that LA+ L ≤ B2 ≤ LC + L.
(iii) If B

t+1(LC) < LC ⇔ Bt+1(L+ LC) ≥ L+ LC ⇔ (C)2 L2Δhc +CL4h˜c + L
(
Δu−2h˜
c
)
< LC
then LC ≤ B1 ≤ L and LC + L ≤ B2 ≤ 2L.
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8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. From (6)-(8), the rate of education in a culturally-balanced equilibrium equals at each
date t
λt
(
Bt
2L
)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
(Δu)
Bt
2L
+(Bt2L)
2
(2ĥ)
c
when 0 ≤ Bt ≤ 2LA(
Bt
2L
)2 2Δh
c
+ Bt
L
2h˜
c
− (2h˜)
c
+ Δu
c
when 2LA ≤ Bt ≤ 2LC
− (Bt
2L
)2 (2h˜)
c
+ Bt
2L
(1− Δu
c
+ 4h˜
c
) + Δu−2h˜
c
when 2LC ≤ Bt ≤ 2L.
Hence, from (16), we have
B

t+1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
B2t
1
L
ĥ
c
+Bt
(Δu)
c
when 0 ≤ Bt ≤ 2LA
B2t
1
L
Δh
c
+Bt
4h˜
c
+ 2L
(
Δu−2h˜
c
)
when 2LA ≤ Bt ≤ 2LC
−B2t 1L h˜c +Bt(1− Δuc + 4h˜c ) + 2L
(
Δu−2h˜
c
)
when 2LC ≤ Bt ≤ 2L.
B

t+1(Bt) is a continuous function of Bt. It is easy to check that B

t+1(Bt) is increasing over
[0, 2L]. Further, B

t+1(0) = 0. From Assumption 2, we know that B

′
t+1(0) = Δu/c < 1. Hence,
lim
Bt→0+
(
B

t+1(Bt)−Bt
)
< 0. We have B

t+1(2L) = 2L. From Assumption 2, we know that 0 <
B

′
t+1(2L) = 1 − (Δu/c) < 1. Hence, Bt+1(Bt) must cross the 45◦ line from above at Bt = 2L,
formally lim
Bt→2L−
(
B

t+1(Bt)−Bt
)
> 0. As B

t+1(0) = 0, lim
Bt→0+
(
B

t+1(Bt)−Bt
)
< 0 and B

t+1(Bt)
must cross the 45◦ line from above at Bt = 2L, it is easy to deduce that B

t+1(Bt) must cross the
45◦ line from below once. Hence, there exists 0 < B < 2L such that B

t+1(B
) = B.
Let us provide information on B :
(i) We can ﬁrst show that B > 2LA. This amounts to show that B

t+1(Bt) < Bt for Bt ∈
[0, 2LA]. Hence, this inequality is equivalent to
Δu+Bt(2ĥ)
c
< 1.
For Bt = 2LA, we have
Δu
c
+
A(2ĥ)
c
< 1.
Given that A ≡ 1− (Δu/2h˜) we have
Δu
c
+
(
2ĥ
c
− Δu
h˜
∗ ĥ
c
)
< 1
which is equivalent to
Δu
c
(
1− ĥ
h˜
)
+
(
2ĥ
c
)
< 1
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which can be written as follows
1
Δu
c
(
−Δh
h˜
)
+
(
2ĥ
c
) > 1.
Multiplying both the numerator and denominator of the LHS of this inequality by c/2ĥ leads to
c
2ĥ
Δu
(2ĥ)
(
−Δh
h˜
)
+ 1
> 1
which is equivalent to
c
2ĥ
− Δu
2ĥ
> 1− Δu
2h˜
which is Assumption 3. Hence, the result.
(ii) If B

t+1(2LA) ≤ 2LA ⇔ (Δu + A2ĥ)/c ≤ 1 and Bt+1(2LC) > 2LC ⇔ (C)2 L(2Δh/c) +
CL(4h˜/c) + L
(
(Δu− 2h˜)/c
)
≥ LC then 2LA ≤ B ≤ 2LC. Considering item (ii) of Proof of
Proposition 3, we can see that when LA ≤ B1 ≤ LC and that LA+ L ≤ B2 ≤ LC + L we also
have 2LA ≤ B ≤ 2LC.
(iii) If B

t+1(2LC) ≤ 2LC ⇔ (C)2 L(2Δh/c)+CL(4h˜/c)+L
(
(Δu− 2h˜)/c
)
< LC then 2LC ≤
B ≤ 2L. Considering item (iii) of Proof of Proposition 3, we can see that when LC ≤ B1 ≤ L
and LC + L ≤ B2 ≤ 2L we also have 2LC ≤ B ≤ 2L.
8.5 Comparing Social Dynamics under cultural divide and cultural
integration
We oﬀer the following
Proposition 6 (i) When B1 ∈ [LA,LC] and B2 ∈ [LA+ L,LC + L], we have B ∈ [2LA, 2LC]
and B1 ≤ B ≤ B2 .
(ii) When B1 ∈ [LC,L] and B2 ∈ [LC + L, 2L], we have B ∈ [2LC, 2L] with
B ≤ B2 and,
if 2(c−Δu)/(2ĥ) > 1 then B1 < B

,
otherwise B1  B

⇐⇒ L
(
−3
(
(2h˜)
c
− Δu
c
)
+
(√
2(1− Δu
2h˜
)
)((
4h˜
c
− Δu
c
)))
 0.
Proof. We already know that when B1 ∈ [LA,LC] and B2 ∈ [LA+ L,LC + L] , respectively
B1 ∈ [LC,L] and B2 ∈ [LC + L, 2L] , we have B ∈ [2LA, 2LC] , respectively B ∈ [2LC, 2L] .
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(i) Let us show that B > B1 when B

1 ∈ [LA,LC] and B ∈ [2LA, 2LC]. If 2LA > LC, it
is obvious that B > B1 . If 2LA < LC, we are going to show that
B

t+1(Bt) > B

t+1(Bt) for any Bt ∈ [LA,LC] ∩ [2LA, 2LC] .
We have
B

t+1(Bt)−B

t+1(Bt) =
B2t
L
Δh
c
− L
(
Δu− 2h˜
c
)
According to Assumption 2, we have Δu < 2h˜, we thus deduce that B

t+1(Bt) − Bt+1(Bt) > 0.
This implies that B

t+1(.) intersects the 45
◦ line before B

t+1(.).
Let us consider the case B1 ∈ [LC,L] and B ∈ [2LC, 2L]. If 2C > 1, it is obvious that
B > B1 . If 2C < 1, we are going to study for any Bt ∈ [LC,L] ∩ [2LC, 2L]
B

t+1(Bt)−B

t+1(Bt) = −
B2t
L
h˜
c
− L
(
Δu− 2h˜
c
)
As Δu− 2h˜ < 0 given Assumption 2, we have
B

t+1(Bt)  B

t+1(Bt) if and only if L(2h˜−Δu) 
B2t
L
h˜
which is equivalent to
B

t+1(Bt)  B

t+1(Bt) if and only if L
√
2(1− Δu
2h˜
)  Bt.
We will thus have
B1  B

if and only if B

t+1
(
L
√
2(1− Δu
2h˜
)
)
 L
√
2(1− Δu
2h˜
)
which is equivalent to
B1  B

if and only if L
(
−3
(
2h˜
c
− Δu
c
)
+
(√
2(1− Δu
2h˜
)
)((
4h˜
c
− Δu
c
)))
 0.
(iii) Let us consider the case B2 ∈ [LA+ L,LC + L] and B ∈ [2LA, 2LC] and let us show
that B < B2 . If 2LC < LA+L, it is obvious that B
 < B2 . If 2LC > LA+L, we are going to
show that
B

t+1(Bt) > B

t+1(Bt) for any Bt ∈ [LA+ L,LC + L] ∩ [2LA, 2LC] .
We have
B

t+1(Bt)−B

t+1(Bt) = −B2t
1
L
Δh
c
+ 4Bt
Δh
c
+ L
(
Δu+ 2h˜− 2Δh
c
− 1
)
> 0
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The above function has its maximum in Bt = L and we have
B

t+1(2LC)−B

t+1(2LC) = 4L
Δh
c
+ L
(
Δu+ 2h˜− 2Δh
c
− 1
)
= L
(
2ĥ− (c−Δu)
c
)
.
According to Assumption 2 (c − Δu)/(2ĥ) < 1, hence Bt+1(2LC) − Bt+1(2LC) > 0. Hence,
B

t+1(Bt) > B

t+1(Bt) for any Bt ∈ [LA+ L,LC + L] ∩ [2LA, 2LC] implying that Bt+1(.) in-
tersects the 45◦ line before B

t+1(.) and that B
 < B2 . Let us now consider the case where
B2 ∈ [LC + L, 2L] and B ∈ [2LC, 2L] and let us show that B < B2 .We are going to show that
B

t+1(Bt) > B

t+1(Bt) for any Bt ∈ [LC + L, 2L] ∩ [2LC, 2L] .
We have
B

t+1(Bt)−B

t+1(Bt) =
B2t
L
h˜
c
−Bt4h˜
c
+ 4L
h˜
c
=
2h˜
c
(
Bt√
2L
−
√
2L
)2
> 0.
Hence, B

t+1(.) intersects the 45
◦ line before B

t+1(.) and B

2 > B
.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 5
We skip the Proof of item (i) as it is formally equivalent to the Proof of Proposition 1. Let us men-
tion that stability of the culturally-balanced equilibrium arises if R(wz, ĥ, 0, Bt) < R(wz, h˜, 0, Bt)
for z = r, p. We denote by N̂ zt (N̂
z,j
t ), respectively N˜
z
t (N˜
z,j
t ), the number of parents with income
wz who are believers, respectively non-believers, in the whole population (in area j). A formal
equivalent of item (ii) of Proposition 5 is given by both following propositions:
Proposition 7 Consider that (ĥ − h˜)(Δw + Δu − (c/2)) ≥ 0 implying that R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) >
R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p, any ρt < wp and Bt. At any date t, we have the following results
1. If N̂ rt ≥ L then the equilibrium [ρ∗t = ρ̂r(1), b1∗t = 1] exists and it is stable.
2. If N̂ rt < L, then we have the following results
2.a) If R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) for all ρ and Bt then
(i) the equilibrium [ρ∗t = ρ˜
r(N̂ rt /L), b
1∗
t = N̂
r
t /L] exists if N̂
r
t ≥ Bt/2 and N˜ rt + N̂ rt > L. It is
stable.
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(ii) the equilibrium [ρ∗t = ρ̂
p((L − N˜ rt )/L), b1∗t = (L − N˜ rt )/L] exists if L − N˜ rt > Bt/2 and
N˜ rt + N̂
r
t < L. It is stable.
(iii) the equilibrium [ρ∗t = ρ˜
p(Bt/L), b
1∗
t = Bt/L] exists if N˜
p
t > L.
2.b) If R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) for all ρ and Bt then,
(i) the equilibrium [ρ∗t = ρ̂
p(1), b1∗t = 1] exists if Bt ≥ L. It is stable,
(ii) the equilibrium [ρ∗t = ρ˜
r(Bt/L), b
1∗
t = Bt/L] exists if Bt < L and N˜
p
t < L. It is stable.
(iii) the equilibrium [ρ∗t = ρ˜
p(Bt/L), b
1∗
t = Bt/L] exists if Bt < L and N˜
p
t > L. It is stable.
2.c) If there exists some bt ∈ [Bt/2L, 1] such that ρ˜r(b) = ρ̂p(b), L = N̂ rt + N̂p,1t + N˜ r,1t =
N̂p,2t + N˜
r,2
t + N˜
p
t with N̂
wr
t + N̂
p,1
t > N̂
p,2
t then the equilibrium [ρ
∗ = ρ˜r(bt) = ρ̂
p(bt), b
1∗
t = bt]
exists. It is stable if and only if R(wr, h˜, ρ
∗
t , Bt)−R(wp, ĥ, ρ∗t , Bt) > 0.
Proposition 8 Consider that R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) < R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p implied by either
Δw +Δu− (c/2) > 0, ĥ < h˜ and (ĥ− h˜)(Δw +Δu− (c/2)) + 4h˜2 < 0 or Δw +Δu− (c/2) < 0,
ĥ > h˜ and (ĥ− h˜)(Δw +Δu− (c/2) + 4(ĥ+ h˜)) + 4h˜2 < 0. At any date t, we have the following
results
1. If R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) < R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt) for all ρt, Bt, no culturally-divided equilibrium exists.
2. If R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt) for all ρt, Bt then
(i) the equilibrium [ρt = ρ̂
r
t (N̂
r,1
t /L), b
1
t = N̂
r,1
t /L] exists if L − N˜ rt = N̂ r,1t > Bt/2. It is
stable.
(ii) the equilibrium [ρt = ρ˜
p
t (N̂
r
t /L), b
1
t = N̂
r
t /L] exists if N̂
r
t > Bt/2, N˜
r
t + N̂
r
t < L and
N˜ rt + N̂
r
t + N˜
p
t > L. It is stable.
Proof. Let us ﬁrst consider Proposition 7.
Case 1. When N̂ rt ≥ L, we consider the urban conﬁguration such that urban area 1 is inhabited
by only rich believers. It turns out that b1t = 1 > b
2
t . Given that R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt)
for z = r, p, any ρt and Bt, with ρ = ρ̂
r(1), we have:
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ̂r(1)) = a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ̂r(1)) > a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂r(1)) > a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂r(1)) > a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
.
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The duple [ρ̂r(1), b1t = 1] is an equilibrium as nobody has an incentive to move. Further,
whatever the small perturbation of the equilibrium (immigration of individuals N˜ r or N̂p or also
N˜p in area 1), individuals N˜ r, N̂p and N˜p still strictly prefer to live in urban area 2. This
equilibrium is stable.
Case 2. When N̂ rt < L, we have to consider three cases.
2.a) R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) for all ρt and Bt . We construct a urban conﬁguration
such that rich individuals whatever their beliefs live in an area which is at least better as the one in-
habited by the poor individuals. (i) If N̂ rt ≥ Bt/2, and given that R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt)
for all ρt and Bt then it is possible that urban area is inhabited only by rich individuals such that
b1t = N̂
r
t /L > b
2
t . Given that, for all ρt and Bt, R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p and
that R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt), with ρt = ρ˜
r(N̂ rt /L) we have:
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜r(N̂
r
t
L
)) < a
(
2(N̂ rt /L)− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜r(N̂
r
t
L
)) = a
(
2(N̂ rt /L)− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂r(N̂
r
t
L
)) > a
(
2(N̂ rt /L)− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂r(N̂
r
t
L
)) > a
(
2(N̂ rt /L)− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
.
Hence, nobody has an incentive to move. The duple [ρ˜r(N̂ rt /L), b
1
t = N̂
r
t /L] is thus an equilibrium.
Whatever the small perturbation of the area 1 population, individuals N̂ rt , respectively N̂
p and
N˜p, still strictly prefer to live in urban area 1, respectively urban area 2. This equilibrium is stable.
If N̂ rt < Bt/2, it would not be possible that urban area 1 inhabited only by rich individuals would
be such that b1t > b
2
t . (ii) If L − N˜ rt > Bt/2 and N˜ rt + N̂ rt < L, and given that R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) >
R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) for all ρ and Bt then it is possible that urban area is inhabited by the whole rich
population and a fraction of the N̂pt population such that b
1
t =
L−N˜rt
L
> b2t . Given that, for any ρt
and Bt, R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p, and that R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt),
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we have:
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ̂p(L− N˜
r
t
L
)) < a
(
2(L− N˜ rt )/L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ̂p(L− N˜
r
t
L
)) < a
(
2(L− N˜ rt )/L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂p(L− N˜
r
t
L
)) = a
(
2(L− N˜ rt )/L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂p(L− N˜
r
t
L
)) > a
(
2(L− N˜ rt )/L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
.
No one has an incentive to move. The duple [ρ̂p((L − N˜ rt )/L), b1t = (L − N˜ rt )/L] is thus an
equilibrium. Whatever the small perturbation of the area 1 population, individuals N̂ rt and N˜
r
t ,
respectively N˜pt still strictly prefer to live in urban area 1, respectively 2. This equilibrium is
stable. (iii) If N˜pt > L, given that, for any ρt and Bt, R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p
and that R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) then, if urban area 1 is inhabited by the whole believer
population, that is b1t = Bt/L, we have
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜p(Bt
L
)) < a
(
Bt/L
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜p(1)) < a
(
Bt/L
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜p(1)) < a
(
Bt/L
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜p(1)) = a
(
Bt/L
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
.
No one has an incentive to move. The duple [ρ˜p(Bt/L), b
1
t = Bt/L] is thus an equilibrium.
After a small reduction of the number of believers in area 1, individuals N̂ rt , N˜
r and N̂p still
strictly prefer to live in urban area 1. This equilibrium is stable.
Items (i), (ii) and (iii) cover the whole possible cases.
2.b) R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt) for all ρt and Bt. Poor believers are thus able to outbid
rich non-believers to live in the better neighborhood. We thus construct urban conﬁguration
where all believers live in an area at least as good as the area inhabited by non-believers. (i)
If Bt ≥ L, given that, for any ρt and Bt, R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p and
that R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt), then if urban area 1 is inhabited by the whole believer
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population, that is b1t = 1, we have:
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ̂p(1)) < a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ̂p(1)) > a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂p(1)) = a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜p(1)) > a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
.
No one has an incentive to move. The duple [ρ̂p(1), b1t = 1] is thus an equilibrium. After a
small reduction of the number of believers in area 1, individuals N̂ rt , respectively N˜
r and N˜p, still
strictly prefer to live in urban area 1, respectively 2. This equilibrium is stable. (ii) If Bt < L
and N˜pt < L, given that, for any ρt and Bt, R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p and
that R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt), then if urban area 1 is inhabited by the whole believer
population, that is b1t = Bt/L, with ρ = ρ˜
r(Bt/L) we have:
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜r(Bt
L
)) < a
(
(Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜r(Bt
L
)) = a
(
(Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜r(Bt
L
)) < a
(
(Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜r(Bt
L
)) > a
(
(Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
.
No one has an incentive to move. The duple [ρ˜r(Bt/L), b
1
t = Bt/L] is thus an equilibrium.
After a small reduction of the number of believers in area 1, individuals N̂ rt and N̂
p
t , respectively
N˜pt , still strictly prefer to live in urban area 1, respectively 2. This equilibrium is stable. (iii) If
Bt < L and N˜
p
t > L, given that, for any ρt and Bt, R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p
and that R(wp, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wr, h˜, ρt, Bt), then if urban area 1 is inhabited by the whole believer
population, that is b1t = Bt/L, with ρ = ρ˜
p(Bt/L) we have:
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜p(Bt
L
)) < a
(
Bt/L
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜p(Bt
L
)) < a
(
Bt/L
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜p(Bt
L
)) < a
(
Bt/L
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜p(Bt
L
)) = a
(
Bt/L
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
.
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No one has an incentive to move. The duple [ρ˜p(Bt/L), b
1
t = Bt/L] is thus an equilibrium.
After a small reduction of the number of believers in area 1, individuals N̂ rt , N̂
p
t and N˜
r
t still
strictly prefer to live in urban area 1. This equilibrium is stable.
2.c) Let us now consider that indiﬀerence curves may cross more than once. If for some
bt ∈ [Bt/2L, 1], we have ρ such that
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ) < a
(
2bt − (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ) = a
(
2bt − (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ) = a
(
2bt − (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ) > a
(
2− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
then [ρ = ρ˜r(bt) = ρ̂
p(bt), b
1
t = bt] is an equilibrium as no one has an incentive to move. Let us
consider a move of ε individuals N̂p from area 2 in area 1 and a reverse move of individuals N˜ r.
If and only if R(wr, h˜, ρ, Bt)− R(wp, ĥ, ρ, Bt) > 0, individuals N˜ r who have been jarred out from
area 1 are able to outbid individuals N̂p to live in area 1.
Let us now consider Proposition 8.
Case 1. If R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) < R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt) for all ρt, Bt, non-believers individuals are able
to outbid believers to live in a better neighborhood. Given that, for all ρt, Bt, R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) <
R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt) and R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) < R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p, it is thus impossible to have an
equilibrium with b1t > b
2
t as all non-believers living in area 2 would have an incentive to move in
area 1 and can outbid its believers inhabitants.
Case 2. If R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt) for all ρt, Bt, rich believers are able to outbid poor
non-believers. Given that, for all ρt, Bt, R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt) and R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) <
R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p, we can build an equilibrium with b
1
t > b
2
t . Two cases must be
considered. (i) When N̂ rt > Bt/2 and L − N˜ rt = N̂ r,1t > Bt/2, given that, for all ρt, Bt,
R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) < R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p and that R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt), then
if urban area 1 is inhabited by the whole rich non-believers population and a number N̂ r,1t of rich
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believers, that is b1t = N̂
r,1
t /L, with ρ = ρ̂
r(N̂ r,1t /L) we have:
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ̂r(N̂
r,1
t
L
)) < a
(
2N̂ r,1t /L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ̂r(N̂
r,1
t
L
)) = a
(
2N̂ r,1t /L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂r(N̂
r,1
t
L
)) > a
(
2N̂ r,1t /L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ̂r(N̂
r,1
t
L
)) > a
(
2N̂ r,1t /L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
.
The duple [ρ̂r(N̂ r,1t /L), b
1
t = N̂
r,1
t /L] is an equilibrium as nobody has an incentive to move.
Further, whatever the small perturbation of the equilibrium, individuals N˜ rt , respectively N̂
p
t and
N˜pt , still strictly prefer to live in urban area 1, respectively 2. This equilibrium is stable.
(ii) When N̂ rt > Bt/2, N˜
r
t + N̂
r
t < L and N˜
r
t + N̂
r
t + N˜
p
t > L, given that, for all ρt, Bt,
R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) < R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p and that R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt) then if
urban area 1 is inhabited by the whole rich population, b1t = N̂
r
t /L and ρ = ρ˜
p(N̂ rt /L) we have:
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜p(N̂
r
t
L
)) < a
(
2N̂ rt /L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ˜p(N̂
r
t
L
)) < a
(
2N̂ rt /L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜p(N̂
r
t
L
)) = a
(
2N̂ rt /L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2h˜)
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− Bt
L
)− c
2
)
u(wp)− u(wp − ρ˜p(N̂
r
t
L
)) > a
(
2N̂ rt /L− (Bt/L)
c
)
(2ĥ)
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥ
Bt
L
− c
2
)
.
The duple [ρ˜p(N̂ rt /L), b
1
t = N̂
r
t /L] is an equilibrium as no body has an incentive to move.
Further, whatever the small perturbation of the equilibrium, individuals N˜ rt , N̂
r
t , respectively N˜
p
t ,
still strictly prefer to live in urban area 1, respectively 2. This equilibrium is stable.
When N̂ rt > Bt/2, N˜
r
t + N̂
r
t < L and N˜
r
t + N̂
r
t + N˜
p
t < L, given that, for all ρt, Bt,
R(wz, ĥ, ρt, Bt) < R(wz, h˜, ρt, Bt) for z = r, p and that R(wr, ĥ, ρt, Bt) > R(wp, h˜, ρt, Bt), it is
impossible to have an equilibrium such that b1t > b
2
t as area 2 would be inhabited by poor believ-
ers, i.e. b2t = 1.
Finally, we provide a numerical example to prove item (iii) of Proposition 5. Let us assume that
the instantaneous utility function is u(x) = −x2+2x+1. It is increasing for 0 < x < 1 and strictly
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concave. We have multiple equilibria if and only if the following equations are simultaneously
satisﬁed for diﬀerent values of b1t
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ)
2h˜
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− B
L
)− c
2
) = a(2b1t − BtL
c
)
(20)
u(wr)− u(wr − ρ)
2h˜
(
Δw +Δu− 2h˜(2− B
L
)− c
2
) = u(wp)− u(wp − ρ)
2ĥ
(
Δw +Δu+ 2ĥB
L
− c
2
) . (21)
Parameters are supposed to take the following values wr = 0.98, wp = 0.34, Δw = 0.64, c = 0.75,
h˜ = 0.22, ĥ = 0.45 and a = 0.8. Consider that Bt/L = 1.5. We have Δu ≡ u(wr) − u(wp) =
0.4352. Note that these values satisfy both assumptions 2 and 3. Assumption 2 (i) Δu/c =
0.4352/0.75 < 1, (ii) (c − Δu)/2ĥ = (0.75 − 0.4352)/0.9 < 1, (iii) Δu/2h˜ = 0.98909 < 1.
Assumption 3 (c−Δu)/2ĥ = 0.349 78 > 1−Δu/2h˜ = 0.01091.
There exist three urban equilibria:
ρ b1t Stability
Culturally-Balanced City 0 Bt
2L
= 0.75 yes
Culturally-Divided City 0.14958 0.81291 no
Culturally-Divided City ρ =
⎧⎨⎩ ρ̂
p(1) if N̂ r < L
ρ̂r(1) otherwise.
1 yes
We can compute that both duples (ρ = 0, b1t = Bt/2L = 0.2475) and (ρ = 0.14958, b
1
t =
0.81291) are solutions of (20)-(21). Moreover, according to (17) and (18) and Deﬁnition 2, the
culturally-balanced city is stable, i.e. R(wr, h˜, 0, 0.75) = 2.4687 > R(wp, ĥ, 0, 0.75) = 2.4367. The
culturally-divided city (ρ = 0.14958, b1t = 0.81291) is unstable as R(wr, h˜, 0.14958, 1.5) = 1.259 8 <
R(wp, ĥ, 0.14958, 1.5) = 2.4015. The third equilibrium is a culturally-divided one with b
1
t = 1 with
the equilibrium rent equals to ρ = ρ̂p(1) = 0.48416 if N̂ r < L and ρ = ρ̂r(1) = 0.914 83 otherwise.
It is stable as ρ̂p(1) = 0.484 16 > ρ˜r(1) = 0.31628.
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